


Consider a pure exchange economy with two consumers A, B and two good types 1, 2. Further suppose that each consumer has as utility function $u(x_1, x_2) = \max(x_1, x_2)$ and $\theta_1 = \theta_2$, i.e. the total amount of each good type in the economy is the same.

- a. Draw for this economy an edgeworth box with for each consumer some indifference curves.
- b. Show that the allocation where consumer A has all goods is strongly pareto inefficient. Is it also weakly pareto inefficient?
- c. Determine the set of strongly pareto efficient allocations.
- d. Determine the set of weakly pareto efficient allocations.
- e. Determine the core.

Consider the following 2-player extensive form game with perfect information given by the game tree



- How many subgames, and which, does this game have?
- How many, and which, strategies does player 1 have? How many, and which, strategies does player 2 have?
- Give a completely elaborated plan of play for player 1 that is not a strategy.
- Determine a normal form for this game.
- Determine for each player the dominant and strictly dominant strategies.
- Determine all nash equilibria.
- Determine a mixed strategy nash equilibrium.
- Determine all subgame perfect nash equilibria.